The Politics of Negotiation: America's Dealings With Allies, Adversaries, and Friends by Linda P. Brady

Author:Linda P. Brady [Brady, Linda P.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781469639604
Google: iNA3DwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 8976673
Publisher: UNC Press Books
Published: 1991-10-21T00:00:00+00:00

Bargaining and Concession-making

Question 4: What strategies and tactics did the parties use during the negotiations? How did differences in bargaining style influence the process and outcome of the negotiations? What was the role of politics in the selection of strategies and tactics? If the negotiations resulted in the signing of a formal agreement, how did the process of concession-making occur?

Consistent with their changing interests and objectives in the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted very different bargaining strategies in the early phase of the talks than in the later phase. Between November 1980 and December 1983 neither side seriously pursued an agreement. As a result, the proposals offered by both sides from 1980 to 1983 were not meant to be taken seriously. Some U.S. officials privately indicated that the zero option was an ideal negotiating position because the Soviet Union would never agree to it—thus, the United States would get credit for pursuing arms control, but the allies would have no alternative but to accept the new American missiles in the fall of 1983.56 For their part, the Soviet Union tabled a series of nonnegotiable proposals in Geneva, while announcing a unilateral freeze on the deployment of any new medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union and threatening “retaliatory steps” if NATO proceeded with plans to deploy the new missiles.57 The carrot and stick approach failed, and Soviet negotiators walked out of the talks in November 1983 as the first missiles began arriving in Western Europe.

When the negotiations resumed in March 1985, in the context of new negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, the United States seemed prepared to deal while the Soviet Union insisted that there could be no progress on the reduction of offensive weapons unless the United States agreed to limit space arms. Both the decision to resume arms control discussions and the bargaining and concession-making on major issues that occurred between March 1985 and the signing of the treaty in December 1987 were motivated primarily by political considerations in Washington and Moscow.

In Washington, President Reagan had been reelected by a landslide and was beginning to think in terms of his foreign policy legacy. Moreover, support for the high levels of defense spending that characterized the first four years of the Reagan administration was declining, both in the Congress and in the public at large. The administration undoubtedly believed that returning to the arms control table would help strengthen wavering support for major nuclear weapons programs.58

In Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev had assumed office and faced serious domestic economic problems. Shifting public attention to foreign affairs and going on the arms control offensive, much as the Soviet Union had done during 1982 and 1983, was an attractive strategy for the new Soviet leader. Concern about the implications of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative for the security of the Soviet Union also prompted Gorbachev to return to the negotiating table, although SDI has been given more credit than it probably deserves for bringing the Soviet Union back to the talks.

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